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美国不动产投资信託公司间董事重叠下对公司绩效及政策之影响

【中文摘要】:Chou et al. (2013)研究指出,若公司董事同时有兼任其他公司董事的情形,其在外兼任之公司数目越多,对原公司价值有越显着之正向影响。Bouwman (2009)研究亦指出,当公司与其他公司之董事有重叠的情形时,其公司政策也会受到董事重叠(director overlap)之公司的影响,如公司的董事会规模、执行长薪酬、董事薪酬…等治理政策,表示在公司之前存在着社会网路 (social network),影响公司间政策的制定及绩效。
  本文以美国不动产投资信託(REITs)产业为研究对象,探讨此一受到政府法规高度管制的产业,在公司董事同时兼任其他公司董事的情形下,是否对公司治理政策及绩效造成相当程度的影响。研究结果发现,董事重叠之现象会影响不动产投资信託产业之公司治理政策,且对于公司经营绩效则也有显着之影响。我们认为,对于美国REITs产业而言,在公司治理政策的制定上,依然会受到社会网络 (social network)的影响。而同样地,相较于一般产业,美国不动产投资信託(REITs)并不因其产业性质特殊而有不同结果,对公司经营绩效而言,同样有显着的正向影响,即使在透过资产类型的不同加以控制后,依然有相同的结果。
【英文摘要】:Chou et al. (2013) have indicated that when the number of simultaneous directorships held by a person increases, the effects of those simultaneous directorships on the director’s original firm are significantly positive. Additionally, Bouwman (2009) has noted that the phenomenon of director overlap—meaning that a firm’s directors also hold directorships at other firms—affects firm policies such as board size, CEO and director salaries, and other governance policies.
  Our target industry is U.S. real estate investment trusts (REITs), a highly regulated industry. We want to discuss whether the phenomenon of director overlap will exert considerable influence on corporate governance policies and performance. Our study finds that the phenomenon of director overlap will affect a REIT’s corporate governance policies and significantly affect its operating performance. We believe that the U.S. REIT industry remains affected by social networks in establishing corporate governance policies. Moreover, as in other industries, the operating performance of U.S. REITs is significantly impacted by social networks.
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  • 来源:中山大学;作者:林昇亿
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