专注论文查重修改6年+经验

公司治理、内控缺失与经营绩效关联性之探讨 -以上市上柜公司为例

【中文摘要】:本研究以2011至2013年台湾之上市柜公司为研究样本,取得样本数为4146个观测值。由公司治理的角度,以股权结构、董监事组成、关係人交易及企业社会责任四大构面共十六项自变数,利用迴归统计方法,探讨公司治理与经营绩效的关联性,研究结果发现:
1、 外资持股比率与经营绩效呈显着正相关。
2、 经理人持股比率与经营绩效呈显着正相关。
3、 控制股东透过金字塔结构、交叉持股取得控制权与经营绩效呈显着负相关。
本研究进一步以内控缺失为调节变数,探讨内控缺失对公司治理及经营绩效之关联性是

文懂论文网,论文查重最佳选择,立即论文查重,马上防止抄袭,提高论文品质

否产生调节效果。研究结果发现:
1、 内控缺失对大股东持股比率与经营绩效RO

szwox.com_094
E之调节效果呈显着负相关。
2、 内控缺失对盈余股份偏离比与经营绩效ROA之调节效果呈显着负相关。
3、 内控缺失对最终控制股东成员担任董监事席次比率与经营绩效ROA之调节效果呈显着负相关。
4、 内控缺失对外部董事席次比率与经营绩效ROA及Tobin''sQ之调节效果呈显着负相关。
【英文摘要】:The study samples are totally 4146 companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation from 2011 to 2013, but excluding banks and insurance companies.In this study, we used four dimensions and sixteen independent variables, and we used the regression equation statistical methods to find out the relationship between corporate governance and operating performance. The corporate governance variables include shareholding structure ,composed of directors and supervisors, related party transactions and corporate social responsibility. The empirical results show that:
1.The ratio of foreign ownership and operating performance was positively correlated and significant

没时间修改论文,不用担心,文懂论文网修改论文专业,放心,先修改,后付钱

.
2.The ratio of managerial ownership and operating performance was positively correlated and significant.
3.The ultimate controlling shareholder gain the controlling rights by pyramid structures & cross-shareholdings and operating performance was negative correlated and significant.

In this study ,we further used the internal contrrol weaknesses as the moderator variable to explore the moderating effect between corporate governance and operating performance. The empirical results show that:
1.The moderator effect of internal contrrol weaknesses has negative correlated and significant between blockholder shareholding ratio and ROE.
2.The moderator effect of internal contrrol weaknesses has negative correlated and significant between earnings shares deviation ratio and ROA.
3.The moderator effect of internal contrrol weaknesses has negative correlated and significant between proportion of directors and supervisors owned by controlling shareholder ratio and ROA.
4.The moderator effect of internal contrrol weaknesses has negative correlated and significant between outside directors seat ratio and ROA.
5.The moderator effect of internal contrrol weaknesses has negative correlated and significant between outside directors seat ratio and Tobin''s Q.
【参考文献】:

  • 中文参考文献
  • Role,Mark J., (1999) ,强管理者、弱所有者:美国公司财务的政治根源(Strong Managers, Weak Owners:The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance),郑文通等译,上海:上海远东出版社。
  • 王怡心(2011),导入内部控制新思维-制度设计与执行的整体规划,中华民国内部稽核协会宣导文件
  • 王怡心(2012),企业社会责任纳入内部控制制度,证券柜檯双月刊第157期P130~P131
  • 王祝三、陈若晖(2008),台湾企业交叉持股与股东利益相关性之研究,财务金融学刊,第16卷,第3期,页1-46。
  • 江秀慧(2006),内部控制理论认知对执行绩效影响之研究-以某公营事业机构为例,国立中山大学企管系硕士论文
  • 行政院金融监督管理委员会证券期货局稽核室(2005),公开发行公司建立内部控制制度处理準则修正重点
  • 佟韵玲(2011) ,导入国际财务準则对内部控制制度影响之个案探讨,国立政治大学经营管理硕士论文
  • 吴明隆 & 涂金堂 (2006),SPSS与统计应用分析. 五南图书出版股份有限公司.
  • 吴琮璠、谢清佳(1999),资讯管理-理论与实务,智胜文化事业有限公司
  • 李明机(2009),简析企业社会责任(CSR)之发展趋势,证券柜檯双月刊第141期P14~P21
  • 李茂能(2012),变项中心化与多元共线性的玄机,测验统计年刊第二十辑
  • 李啓贤(2013),公司治理与内部控制,中华民国证券柜檯买卖中心宣导文件
  • 李华驎、郑佳绫(2014),公司的品格:22个案例,了解公司治理和上市柜公司的财务陷阱,先觉出版社
  • 李馨苹、黄启伦(2009),股权结构、关係人交易与公司绩效,中华管理评论国际学报,第十二卷,第二期;1-31 页
  • 林佩伶(2011),信用风险评等与内部控制缺失之关联性,中原大学会计系硕士论文
  • 林坤进(2011),企业导入IFRS所面临之困难与挑战:以H上市公司为例,台湾大学会计与管理决策组硕士论文
  • 林宛莹及郑桂蕙 (2011),内部稽核需求之决定因素, 第七卷第二期,页 187 -218。
  • 林宜勉(1999),盈余资讯性与管理者股权之关联性研究,企银季刊,23,175-193。
  • 林郁翎、黄建华(2009),考虑公司治理之企业财务危机预警模型,东吴经济商报P23~P56
  • 林崇印(1997),股权结构对委託书争夺战结果之影响,国立中正大学会计研究所硕士論文
  • 林惠婷(2011),内部控制缺失与经营绩效之关联性研究,国立政治大学会计系硕士论文。
  • 林庆隆(2009),管理学界的热门话题-内部控制、风险管理、公司治理,行政管理讲座
  • 林庆隆(2011),强化公部门内控促进良善治理,中华民国内部稽核协会「公部门治理与内控内稽」座谈会
  • 邱佩柔(2012),内部控制缺失与盈余品质之关联性研究,国立政治大学会计系硕士论文。
  • 邱垂昌、黄秀姿(2006),自愿设立独立董事、关係人交易与公司价值关联性之研究:代理理论与讯号发射理论之比较,管理及人文科学,1(3):379-403
  • 邱琼玲(2011),关係人交易对财务危机预测模式影响之探讨,育达科大学报,(26):31-48。
  • 施其佑(2006),股权结构、资本结构与公司价值关聯性之研究,大同大学事业经营研究所硕士論文。
  • 柯承恩、陈耀宗及吴姗颖 (2010),「董监事治理与盈余管理之关联性研究」,第二卷第二期,页 25-60。
  • 胡文馨 (2012),内部控制制度有效性与新上市柜公司绩效关联性之探讨,国立政治大学会计系硕士论文
  • 徐翊哲(2010)公司治理评等对公司价值之影响-信用评等与财务报表品质之角色,东海大学会计系硕士论文
  • 马秀如(1998),内部控制-整体架构,财团法人会计研究发展基金会
  • 马秀如(2002),控制至治理之途,主计月刊第562期,2002年10月号,P63~75
  • 高兰芬(2002),董监事股权质押之代理问题对会计资讯与公司绩效之影响,成功大学会计学系博士论文。
  • 高兰芬、陈振远、李焮慈(2006),资讯透明度及席次控制权与现金流量权偏离对公司绩效之影响-以台湾电子业为例,台湾管理学刊,第6卷,第2期,页 81-104。
  • 张思国、陈脩文、郑益成、黄晓惠(2009),公司治理因素与上市公司内部控制制度关联性之研究,证交资料567期~569期
  • 张训华(1990),股权结构、董事会组成与企业当年财务绩效─以77 年度会计报酬率为準,东吴大学管理科学研究所硕士论文。
  • 张丽娟(2011年5月第14卷2期)财务危机的手法与公司治理困境-以台湾博达企业为例,中华管理评论国际学报
  • 陈正昌、程炳林、陈新丰、刘子键(2003),多变量分析方法-统计软体应用,五南文化事业
  • 陈成宗(2012),公司治理与内部控制缺失关联性研究-以上市银行业为例,国立中正大学高阶主管管理硕士论文
  • 陈宏姿(2001),董监事结构与企业财务绩效关联之研究,国立政治大学会计研究所硕士论文。
  • 陈惠雯(2009),资讯透明度、揭露动机与盈余品质属性关係之研究,国立东华大学会计与财务金融硕士论文
  • 陈丽娟(2004),董事会组成、股权结构、关係人交易与企业绩效关係之研究—以纺织业及电子业为实証,国立成功大学高阶管理硕士在职专班硕士论文
  • 彭筱倩(2004),盈余管理与公司治理关联性之研究-以我国财务危机公司为例,国立政治大学会计研究所硕士论文
  • 游博凯(2012),审计委员会特性对公司经营绩效与资讯揭露品质之影响,国立台中科技大学会计资讯系会计与财税硕士论文
  • 黄秀姿(2005),自愿设立独立董事、关係人交易与公司价值关联性之研究:代理理论 vs. 讯号发射理论,大叶大学H会计资讯学系硕士论文
  • 黄冠智(2008),公司治理评等系统对企业经营绩效与股市报酬影响之研究,国立中山大学企管系硕士论文
  • 黄崇辉(2004),公司治理与经营绩效关联性之研究-以台南地区上市、上柜及公开发行公司为实证,国立成功大学高阶管理硕士论文。
  • 杨朝旭(2004),会计盈余及时性对公司治理结构之影响-以台湾上市公司为例,当代会计,第四卷,第一期,五月, P1~28
  • 叶银华、李存修、柯承恩(2002),公司治理与评等系统,商智文化。
  • 叶银华、柯承恩、李德冠(2002),公司监理机制对于关係人交易的影响,台湾财务金融学会,台北:2002年财务学术研讨会暨博士研究生论坛
  • 叶银华及邱显比(1996),「资本结构、股权结构与公司价值关联性之实证研究:代理成本理论」, ,第七卷第二期,页 57-90
  • 詹锦宏及杨丽弘(2001),台湾上市公司股权结构与经营绩效之研究-产业特性与股权质押之观点,台湾银行季刊,52,202-220
  • 赵雅仪、萧哲芬、廖琼正(2012)关係人交易、税负与公司绩效关联性之实证研究,桃园创新学报 第三十二期 P299~326
  • 刘惠文(2009),公司治理与资本结构之关联性:台湾中小企业之实证,硕士论文,暨南国际大学财务金融学系研究所
  • 蔡信夫、锺惠民、林诗韵(2003),控制股东代理问题与盈余资讯内涵之关联性研究-以台湾上市公司为例,当代会计,4 卷 2 期,143-168
  • 蔡笃村(2002),以内部控制强化公司治理之探讨,国立台湾大学会计学系硕士班硕士论文
  • 郑桂蕙、余俊宪、王兰芬(2012),内部控制缺失与应计品质-独立董监之调节效果,东吴经济商学学报 第79期,2012年12月,P81-120
  • 卢志兴(2007),以COSO五大内部控制构面建构台湾企业内控危机预警模型,元智大学会计学系硕士论文
  • 赖珮华(2013),公司揭露重大内部控制缺失与应计品质之关联性研究-以日本企业为例,国立台湾大学会计学系硕士论文
  • 薛渊心(2009),企业社会责任、企业形象与顾客忠诚度之跨层次研究-以台湾地区银行业为例,辅仁大学硕士論文
  • 谢淑旦、李合龍与李宝桂(2010),资讯揭露评等对企业价值之影响,远东学报,第27卷第 2期:213-228。
  • 锺张涵(2014.03.20),「公司治理指数」、「永续性指数」明年成亮点,联合晚报
  • 苏佩祺(2009),公司治理与盈余管理相关性之探讨,国立中山大学企管系硕士论文
  • 英文参考文献
  • Agrawal, A. & Mandelker, G.N., (1990) ,Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, Journals of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, (25), pp.143-161.
  • Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C.R. ( 1995), Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problem, Working paper, Wharton school, Philadelphia, PA.
  • Aiken, L. S. and West, S. G. (1991), Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting
  • Alfred D.Chandler,Jr.(1977),The Visible Hand:The Managerial Revolution in American Business,Harvard University Press.
  • Amihud, Y., and B. Lev. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics 12 (Autumn): 605-617.
  • Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, (1972)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777
  • Arrow, K. J. (1971),Some Models of Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market. RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, California, RM-6253-RC.
  • Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, and R. LaFond. (2006). The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42 (1-2): 203-243.
  • Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986),The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
  • Baumol, William J. (1958),On the theory of oligopoly,Economica P187-198.
  • Baumol、Marris及Williamson (1960) ,Management Models of Baumol, Marris and Williamson.
  • Baysinger, B. D. and H. D. Butler( 1985) ,Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1, pp. 101-124
  • Beasley, M.S. (1996), An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review (October): 443-466.
  • Belsley, D. (1991). A guide to using the collinearity diagnostics. Management, 4, 33-50. Gatignon, H., & Vosgerau, J. (2005). Moderating effects: The myth of mean centering.
  • Belsley, D. A. (1984), Demeaning conditioning diagnostics through centering. American Statistician, 38(2), 73–77.
  • Berle, A. A., and G. C. Means.(1932) ,The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York, The Macmillan Company.
  • Bhagat, S., & Black, B.S. (1996), Do independent directors matter? Working paper. Center for Law Economic studies, Columbia University, New York.
  • Bhagat, Sanjai, and Bernard Black. (2000) ,Board independence and long-term firm performance,Unpublished paper, University of Colorado.
  • Bhojraj, S. and Sengupta, P. (2003),The Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Bond Ratings and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors, The Journal of Business 76(3): 455-475.
  • Blair, Margaret M. (1995), Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, Washington, DC, USA, The Brookings Institution.
  • Botosan, C. A. (1997) Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review 72 (3): 323-349
  • Botosan, C. A., and M. A. Plumlee, (2002) A re-examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (1): 21-40
  • Bowen, H., (1953), Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. New York: Harper
  • Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease and C. W. Smith, (1998) Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. “, Journal of Financial Economics(20) ,pp.267-292
  • Bryman, A., & Cramer, D. (1997). Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS for Windows : a guide for social scientists
  • Cadbury Committee(1992),Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, London:Gee.
  • Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., Neal, T. L., Jr. Riley, R. A.(2002),Board Characteristics and Audit Fees,” Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.19, p.365-384.
  • Carcello, J. V., Neal, T. L.(2003),Audit Committee Independence and Disclosure: Choice for Financially Distressed Firms,” Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol.11, pp.289-299.
  • Carroll, A. B., (1991), The pyramid of corporate social responsilility: Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders, Business Horizons, 34(4), 39-48.
  • Chan, K. , Li, C. J. (2008),Audit Committee and Finn Value: Evidence on Outside Top Executives as Expert-Independent Directors,Corporate Governance : An International Review,Vol,16,No.1,pp16-31
  • Chung, K. H. & S. W. Pruitt (1994) A simple approximation of Tobin’s q,Financial Management, 70-74
  • Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan and L. H. P. Lang(2002),Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57 (6): 2741-2771.
  • Coase, R. H. (1937),The Nature of the Firm,Economica, 4(16), 386-405.
  • Cochran, P. P. and S. L. Wartick (1988) Corporate Governance: a Literature Review,USA Financial Executives Research Foundation Corporate Leverage and Corporate Dividends.”Financial Management, 18, pp.36-46.
  • Corporate Governance in Emerging Market (2007), Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia.
  • Crutchley, C. E. and R. S. Hansen (1989),A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership,
  • Daily, C. M. and D. R. Dalton (1992),The Relationship Between Governance Structure and Corporate Performance in Entrepreneurial Firms, Journal of Business Venturing, 7: 375-386
  • David F. Larcker, Scott A. Richardson, & A. Irem Tuna (2007). Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting Review, 82(4), 963-1008.
  • DeAngelo, H. (1987), Management Buyouts of Publicly Traded Corporations, in copeland, ed., Modern Finance and Industrial Economics, Chapter 6, New York: Basil Blackwell.
  • Demsetz, H. (1983), The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2):375-390.
  • Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. (1985), The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93(6):1155-1177.
  • Deumes, R., and Knechel, W. R. (2008), Economic incentives for voluntary re-porting on internal risk management and control systems. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 27 (1): 35-66.
  • Diamond, D. W., and R. E. Verrecchia. (1991) Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1325-1359.
  • Donaldson L., Davis, J. H. (1991),Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns, Australian Journal of Management, pp.49-64
  • Doyle Jeffrey T., Weili Ge, and Sarah McVay (2007a), Accruals quality and internal control over financial reporting. The Accounting Review, Vol. 82, No. 52007pp. 1141–1170
  • Doyle, J. T., W. Ge, and S. McVay (2007b), Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, pp.193-223
  • Du, J. and Y. Dai (2005),“Ultimate corporate ownership structures and capital structures: Evidence from east asian economies, ”Corporate Governance: An International Review,13(1), 60-71.
  • Echambadi,R.,& Hess, J. D.(2007). Mean-Centering does not alleviate collinearity problems in moderated multiple regression models. Marketing Science, 26(3), 438–445.
  • Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen (1983),SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
  • Fama, E.F. (1980), Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88(2):288-307.
  • Felo, A. J., Krishnamurthy, S., Solieri, S. A. (2003),Audit Committee Characteristics and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting : An Empirical analysis,working paper, Penn State Great Valley.
  • Friedman, M., (1970), The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, New York Yunes Magazine, September 13, 32-33, 122, 124, 126.
  • Fuerst O.&S.H.Kang (2000),Corporate Governance, Expected Oerating Performance , and Pricing,Working Paper,The George Washington University
  • Fuerst, O., & Kang, S. H. (2000). Corporate governance, expected operation performance , and pricing. Working Paper (Yale School of Management, New Haven).
  • Gatignon, H., & Vosgerau, J. (2005), Moderating effects: The myth of mean centering. Working paper. Retrieved June 1, 2011 from the World Wide Web http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=1583
  • Ge W., and McVay S. (2005), The Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons 19(3):137-158.
  • Godfrey, P. C., (2005), The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder wealth: A risk management perspective, Academy of Management Review, 30(4), 777-798.
  • Goh, Beng Wee. (2009) ,Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control .Contemporary Accounting Research 26.2 : 549-579.
  • Goodpaster, K. E., (1991), Business ethics and stakeholder analysis, Business Ethics
  • Hail, L. (2002) The impact of voluntary corporate disclosures on the ex-ante cost of capital for swiss firms. The European Accounting Review 11 (4): 741-773.
  • Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach (1991), The effect of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management 20 (4): 101-112
  • Hill, C. W., & Snell, S. A. (1989) ,Effects of ownership structure and control on corporate productivity. Academy of Management Journal, 32(1), 25-46.
  • Holderness, C. G. (2003), A survey of blockholders and corporate control. Economic Policy Review 9 (1): 51-63
  • Hudson, C., J. Jahera, and W. Lloyd (1992),“Further Evidence on the Relationship Between Ownership and Performance.”The Financial Review, 27, pp.227-239. interactions, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
  • Huson, M.R., Parrino, R., & Starks, L.T. (2001), Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover, A Long –Term Perspective. Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, pp.2265-2297.
  • Jaccard, J., & Turrisi, R. (2003) Interaction effects in multiple regression Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
  • Jensen, M. C., and R. Ruback. (1983), The market for corporate control:The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11(1-4):5-50.
  • Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. (1976), Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4):305-360.
  • Johnstone, K., Li, C., & Rupley, K. H. (2011). Changes in Corporate Governance Associated with the Revelation of Internal Control Material Weaknesses and Their Subsequent Remediation*. Contemporary Accounting Research,Vol .28,No.1,pp 331-383.
  • Judge, W. Q., Dobbins, G. H. (1995), Antecedents and Effects of outside Director’s Awareness of CEO Decision Style, Journal of Management, 21, pp.43-64.
  • Kesner, I. F. (1987), Directors stock ownership and organization performance: An investigation of Fortune 500 Companies. Journal of Management 13(3):499-508.
  • Kesner, I. F., Victor, B., Lamont, B. T.( 1986) ,Board Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: an investigation of Fortune 500 companies,Academy of Management Journal, 29, pp.789-799
  • Kesner, Idalene F., and Roy B. Johnson. (1990) An investigation of the relationship between board composition and stockholder suits. Strategic Management Journal 11.4, 327-336.
  • Kim, O., and R. E. Verrecchia. (1994) Market liquidity and volume around earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1-2): 41-67
  • La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517.
  • Lang, L. H. P., & Litzenberger, R. H.(1989),Dividend announcements: Cash flow signaling vs. free cash flow hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics. 24(1), 181-192
  • Lang, L., Stultz, R., & Walking, R.(1999). Managerial performance, Tobin's Q and the gains from successful tender offers. Journal of Financial Economics, 24(1), 137-54.
  • Larcker, David F., Scott A. Richardson, and Irem Tuna. (2007), Corporate governance , accounting outcomes, and organizational performance., The Accounting Review 82.4: 963-1008.
  • Lawrence Robert Dicksee(1905),Auditing a Practical Manual for Auditors,BiblioBazaar.
  • Li, C., & Wang, Q. (2006). SOX 4O4 Assessments and Financial Reporting Errors. Available at SSRN 926180.
  • Lindenberg, Eric B., and Stephen A. Ross. (1981),Tobin”s q ratio and industrial organization., Journal of Business :1-32.
  • Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,(1976) Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior , Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305。
  • Millestein, I.M., & Macavoy, P.W. (1998), The active board of directors and performance of the large publicly traded corporation, Columbia Law Journal, Vol. 98, pp.1283-1321.
  • Milton Friedman (1970),The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits,The New York Times Magazine
  • Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. (1988), Management ownership and market valuation:An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20(1-2):293-315.
  • Nagarajan, R., & Carey, P. (2008). Effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and financial statement restatements: The role of management. Working Paper, Monash University.
  • Olson, C. L. (1976),On choosing a test statistic in multivariate analysis of variance. Psychological Bulletin, 83, 579-586.
  • Oviatt, B. M.(1988), Agency and transaction cost perspectives on the manager-shareholder relationship, incentives for congruent interests. Academy of Management Review 13(2):214-225.
  • Patton, A. and J. C. Baker,(1987) Why Won’t Directors Rock the Boat?. Harvard Business Review, Vol.65, pp.10-12、16、18 Performance. Unpublished paper, University of Colorado.
  • Pyle, David H. and Leland, Hayne E. (1977) , Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, Issue 2, p. 371-387 ,Quarterly, 1(1), 53-73.
  • Rajgopal , S., and M. Venkatachalam.(1997), The role of institutional investors in corporate governance: an empirical investigation. Working paper, University of Iowa.
  • Rosenstein, Stuart, and Jeffrey G. Wyatt. (1997),Inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth. Journal of financial Economics 44.2: 229-250.
  • Sengupta, P. (1998) Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting Review 73 (4): 459-474.
  • Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. (1997) A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance June, 737-783.
  • Standard & Poor”sCorporate GovernanceScores and Evaluations Criteria(2004), Methodology and Definitions .
  • Tang, A.P. and Xu, L. (2008) Institutional ownership, Internal Control Material Weaknesses and Firm Performance. Working paper. Morgan State University.
  • Thompson, B. (1994) Common methodology mistakes in dissertations, revisited. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 368 771)
  • Watts, R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman(1978),Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards, The Accounting Review, 53(1), p.p.112-134.
  • Weisbach, M. S.(1988), Outsider directors and CEO turnover.Journal of Financial Economics, 20,pp.431-460.
  • Williamson, O. E. (1979), “Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relation,” Journal of law and Economics, 22, pp.233-261.
  • Xiang,H . and P.E.Zhang(1996),Agency Problems and Financial Contracting,Financial Management ,41,p126-139.
  • Yeh, Y.H., Lee, T.S., & Woidtke, T. (2001). Family control and corporate governance: Evidence for Taiwan. International Review of Finance, 2, 21-48.
  • Zahra, S. A., and J. A. Pearce. (1989) Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15(2):291-334.
  • 来源:中山大学;作者:刘易昀
    文懂论文-重复率修改第一品牌,http://www.szwox.com解决论文查重论文降重复,重复率高等各种论文难题的专家

    最新文章

    • 什么是学术不端行为
      什么是学术不端行为
      什么是学术不端行为 1992 年,由美国国家科学院、国家工程院和国家医学研究院组成的 22 位...
    • 论文降重复服务 1. 本网站及服务 szwox.com提供哪些服务? szwox.com是一个...

    联络我们

    QQ: 767326772
    文懂论文
    网站:http://www.szwox.com/
    E-mail: turuinit@foxmail.com

    我们的服务

    我们提供毕业论文、期刊论文、硕士论文、博士论文、会议论文格式排版,论文查重,重复率修改等服务。强大论文查重系统,一手老师资源,首创安全保密查重修改流程。充分保障客户论文查重安全以及修改后的品质,赢得了老师和同学们的信任和口碑。